I was not surprised when I heard that the Obamacare Web site, healthcare.gov, crashed and burned right out of the gate.
But I was disappointed. Regardless of what I think of the Affordable Care Act, it’s the law. I wanted its implementation, including healthcare.gov, to go well.
Still, I wasn’t surprised because I know how government software gets made. Several years ago I worked in middle management for a company that built a government Web application related to health-care customer service. I was in charge of testing it to make sure it worked. It is probably not going out on a limb to say that the people who built healthcare.gov experienced many of the same kinds of things I experienced on that project.
Let me be plain up front: I was a poor fit for government software development. I was too free-wheeling and entrepreneurial for the control-and-compliance environment that government contracting encourages. I find it difficult to write about the experience without showing my frustrations with its realities. But I think I understand those realities well and objectively.
The government doesn’t know how to do anything. They hire it all out, and then they manage and administer the process. As a result, on this project they relied heavily on compliance with “best practices,” as if those practices contained some sort of magic that delivered quality software. They don’t, of course; the government was shocked when Version 1.0 of our software had typical quality problems right out of the gate. Those practices served primarily to leave an audit trail the government could follow.
In the end, the project was a success. Despite Version 1.0′s glitches, which we quickly fixed, the software was immediately put to use and led to productivity improvements over an older, green-screen system. I spoke with many of the software’s users, and despite a few grumbles most of them liked using it.
But this was one mighty expensive piece of software to build, from winning the contract to defining what the software should do to building and maintaining the software. Here’s why.
The bid process
I was hired after we won the contract, but I heard stories about the bid process. We had no experience building software on this scale, but we wanted into the lucrative cost-plus government contracting business for its guaranteed profit margins. So we offered a lowball bid aimed at getting the government’s attention, not at what it actually was going to take to build the software. And then to our surprise we won the business. After the elation wore off, we were left with an “oh shit” feeling – we needed to actually build the software for that amount. How the heck would we pull that off?
We finished Version 1.0 on my watch, but I don’t know whether we delivered it within budget. It seemed to me, however, that the bid process encouraged underbidding and overspending.
The requirements process
When you make something for the government, they want to know exactly what they’re getting, in excruciating detail. So we started by writing the biggest, thickest requirements document I’ve ever seen. We weren’t building this software from scratch – we bought what was then the leading customer-relationship-management software platform and used it’s software-development toolkit to heavily customize it for our needs. But we had to write highly detailed specifications anyway.
Requirements gathering was more about navigating choppy political waters and brokering compromise than about specifying usable, stable, and scalable software. To develop the requirements, we flew in representatives from every company that would use the software and put them into a big room to hash out how it would work. But all of these companies were themselves government contractors. Their people all knew each other – and, frequently, competed against each other for contracts. Some of them competed against us trying to win this contract. The room was thick with mistrust and agenda,
The building process
The government lives in constant fear of being screwed by its contractors. It goes back to Abraham Lincoln’s time, when rampant fraud among suppliers threatened the Civil War effort. (Seriously. Gunpowder cut with sawdust. Uniforms that dissolved in the rain. Read about it here.)
So not only did the government hire us to build the software, they hired another firm to watch us do it. This is called independent verification and validation, or IV&V. Their job was to make sure that we followed software-development “best practices” and that we built what we said we were going to build. But making matters worse, the company that won the IV&V contract, I’m told, also had bid on the project to build the software in the first place. It always seemed clear to me that they wanted to show us to be fools so that they could take over the project. They ran us ragged over every last minor detail.
The level of perfectionism in terms of “best practice” adherence was intense. Yet when we delivered the software, it had several usability challenges and outright bugs. Worse, it struggled to keep up with the load users placed on it. If you’ve ever built software, you know that these are typical challenges with Version 1.0 of anything. But the government was shocked, dismayed, and appalled. We spent the next several months issuing update releases to make it perform as it needed to. Of course, IV&V ran roughshod over us the whole way – but they were in the hot seat too because their “best practices” had failed to prevent these problems.
The process overhead
Process is tricky to apply well. Too little leads to chaos, too much adds needless cost and delay. I’m not anti-process – rather, I’ve built a career on bringing just the right level of process into a software development environment to make it effective. But most of the process we had to follow involved documenting our work to prove to the government that we had actually done it. This frequently hindered our ability to deliver software cost-effectively, and sometimes stood in the way of quality.
We bought a well-known software product that stored requirements and linked them to the code and the test cases so we could prove that we built and tested each requirement. This involved tracing every requirement to every line of code and every test case, an enormous task in and of itself. I personally created a traceability report each quarter and sent it to the government. All of this required a lot of work from skilled technical people, but in my judgment did not materially help us better build or test the software.
Our test cases were contractually required to be documented in such detail that a trained monkey could execute them. They were at the level of “Step 1. Type your username into the Login box. Expected result: Your username appears in the Login box. Step 2. Type your password into the Password box. Expected result: A row of asterisks appears in the Password box.” A test case that took fifteen minutes to execute could have taken two hours to write and could have been a dozen pages long. We had hundreds of test cases. Many test cases were not appropriate to be added to the regression test suite and be executed every release, so we spent a lot of time writing them to execute them a small handful of times.
It was supposed to be against the rules to write a bug report that had no associated test case. Testers would often stumble upon a bug by accident or find one while doing ad-hoc testing – and then find themselves in a conundrum. Writing the test case that led to the bug and tracing it back to requirements took time we frequently lacked at that point in the game. When the bug was serious enough, everybody looked the other way when it wasn’t associated with a test case. I wonder whether any of the testers avoided writing test cases by falsely associating the bug with an existing test case.
We did get one big break. We lobbied for, and to our astonishment successfully won, an exception to a standard practice: we did not have to print screen shots of the results of every test step. Other projects for which we had contracts had to do this. As you can imagine, managing all that paper slowed progress considerably. Those projects collected those screen shots into boxes, which were sent to offsite storage.
The mounting costs
All of these process steps meant spending more money, mostly in the form of human effort. There were other ways in which the government’s way of making software added costs to the project. Here’s a short, incomplete list:
- Frequent, ongoing training about compliance with standards, which, amusingly, is where I learned about the Civil War fraud.
- Entering time worked on three separate software systems – one for the project-management tool, one for government accounting, and one my employer used to manage time off. I spent an hour a week entering time.
- A prohibition on open-source software. The government wanted all software used to be “supported,” meaning that there had to be a phone number to call for help. So we spent money on commercial tools that sometimes weren’t as capable as open-source versions. In a couple cases, the only tool or component available for a task was open source, and we couldn’t build the application without it. We did get the government to bend the rule for us in those cases, but it took heavily documented justifications and layers of approvals to make it happen.
- Strict separation of duties to protect the government against a rogue contract employee from sabotaging the system. This meant, for example, that I couldn’t restart the computers we used for testing when they needed it, I knew how to do it, but I was not allowed. I had to write a request for an infrastructure engineer to do it, and then wait sometimes for days for it to reach the top of his priority list.
As you can see, there was nothing easy or inexpensive about this project. Yet we got it done and the software worked. It’s still in use today. We showed that it’s possible – just slow and expensive – to build software the government’s way.
So I have great empathy for those who built healthcare.gov. No doubt about it: the site failed, and they built it. But they must feel tremendous pressure right now as they scramble to both handle the heat they’re getting from the government and to rush fixes to the site so that it works well enough. But if their experience building that site was anything like my experience building government software, it’s hardly shocking that it launched with challenges.